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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.1 
According to the noted child psychologist Bruno Bettelheim, the fairy 
tales we read as children greatly affect the adults we later become.2  If 
Bettelheim is correct in his surmise, then it strikes me that the children 
who grow up to be legal academics must be inordinately taken with 
Andersen’s tale, The Emperor’s New Clothes,3 because so many of their 
later legal writings take the form of assertions that the emperor (namely, 
the Supreme Court) has no clothes (namely, no coherent, consistent, 
nonfatally flawed doctrine).  I have not myself escaped the influence of 
this tale, but as a lifelong contrarian, it has affected me in the opposite 
way.  So instead of doggedly deconstructing legal texts, I seek out their 
continuities and harmonies, which are hidden in plain sight. 
Here I apply my approach to an area of law that received opinion 
would find quite unpromising—the proper scope of the federal 
commerce power under our Constitution (hence, the subtitle of this 
Article).  Most critics find this part of constitutional law a better target 
for scorn than praise.  One prominent commentator, Donald Regan, 
expresses a common complaint when he says that “we still do not have 
an adequate theory of the commerce power.”  He then goes on to find 
current doctrine to be “a mess.”4  Even sitting members of the Court find 
great fault with its position here.5  And what they find fault with in the 
current state of affairs, they also criticize in doctrinal history.  Both left 
and right unite in recounting with irritation a roller coaster history of 
Commerce Clause precedent6 that begins with John Marshall’s broad, 
 
 1. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).  2. He says, for example, “Fairy tales, unlike any other form of literature, direct the child to discover his identity and calling, and they also suggest what experiences are needed to develop his character further.” BRUNO BETTELHEIM, THE USES OF ENCHANTMENT: THE MEANING AND IMPORTANCE OF FAIRY TALES 24 (1976).  3. HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSEN, The Emperor’s New Clothes, in THE COMPLETE FAIRY TALES AND STORIES 77 (Erik Christian Haugaard trans., 1974).  4. Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and 
Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554, 554 (1995). 
 5. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 640–47 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 6. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork & Daniel E. Troy, Locating the Boundaries: The 
Scope of Congress’s Power to Regulate Commerce, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 849, 873–83 (2002) (representing the conservative, profederalism approach); Erwin Chemerinsky, 
The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L. REV. 7, 7–12 (2001) (presenting, more briefly, 
VALAURI.DOC 9/18/2019  1:48 PM 
[VOL. 41:  405, 2004]  The Clothes Have No Emperor 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 407 
classic opinions in McCulloch and Gibbons v. Ogden,7 careens from one 
side with the narrow holdings of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries8 to the other with the deferential, anything goes holdings of the 
1937–1995 period,9 before once again veering back to more restrictive 
holdings in United States v. Lopez10 and United States v. Morrison.11  
This seems a poor place to search for continuity and doctrinal consistency. 
Despite all this, I will argue that, in fact, there is and has been a 
consistent, traditional doctrine of the scope of the federal commerce 
power, a doctrine that was shared by the Framers and forcefully stated 
by John Marshall in his seminal Commerce Clause opinions,12 one that 
runs a middle course between later decisions of opposite extremes.  This 
doctrine also harmonizes the Lopez and Morrison opinions both with 
earlier New Deal era decisions and with the Marshall Court opinions.  I 
would go so far as to claim that this doctrine expresses the plain 
meaning of the Constitution, but for the sad fact that this meaning is 
plain to almost no one else today (hence, the title of this Article, one 
nicked from Paul Slansky).13 
This cure for the Court’s current commerce power difficulties 
demands neither the wholesale rejection of present doctrine or precedent 
nor the creation of new law or doctrine from whole cloth.  No, it requires 
little more than the recollection and restoration of the traditional 
constitutional notion of incidental powers,14 which has been temporarily 
 
that history from an advocate of federal power).  These writers and others, of course, then proceed to put quite different spins on this history.  7. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
 8. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276–77 (1918) (holding, notoriously, that the regulation of “the hours of labor of children in factories and mines” was not within the federal commerce power for Congress to enact and was “a purely state authority”). 
 9. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942) (holding, again notoriously, that even the wheat a farmer grows to feed his own livestock may be regulated under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, enacted pursuant to the federal commerce power).  10. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 exceeded the federal commerce power).  11. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000) (holding that the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 was likewise beyond Congress’s commerce power ).  12. This was perhaps most succinctly stated in the headnote to this Article.  Supra text accompanying note 1.  13. See PAUL SLANSKY, THE CLOTHES HAVE NO EMPEROR: A CHRONICLE OF THE AMERICAN ’80S (1989).  14. For a textbook exposition of the Marshallian doctrine of incidental or implied powers as aids in carrying out Congress’s enumerated powers, see JOSEPH STORY, 3 
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obscured by the result-driven modern commerce power debate on the 
Court and in the academy.  In presenting this doctrine, I will start from 
the three basic prongs of the Court’s current Commerce Clause test, 
which the majorities and dissenters in Lopez and Morrison have distilled 
from earlier cases and over which they have essentially agreed to disagree.  
These three elements are Congress’s power to regulate the use of the 
channels of interstate commerce, the instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce, and activity having a substantial effect on interstate commerce.15 
The Lopez and Morrison Courts’ adherence to this three-part commerce 
standard at first seems to be counterproductive, little more than a half 
measure, at once too weak and too strong for its stated purposes.  It is 
too weak because, standing alone, it offers no basis for voiding the two 
acts in question in those cases.  Quite the contrary, the Lopez and 
Morrison dissenters make much of the ability of the questioned statutes’ 
ability to meet the third part of the test—the substantial effects prong.16  
In fact, in order to strike down the statutes, the Court must introduce an 
additional requirement that the regulated activity be economic in 
nature.17  But the Court does not cogently explain the provenance and 
justification for this new criterion.  Worse yet, this move also makes the 
Court’s test too strong, for it throws into question some concededly 
constitutional federal laws that do not regulate economic activity.18 
These shortcomings of the three-part Commerce Clause test, in turn, 
place the Court in an uncomfortable trilemma.  It cannot clearly explain, 
let alone justify, its current stance, but neither does it have a palatable 
alternative.  The way back to pre-1937 notions of “dual federalism” 
would involve the rejection of far more doctrine and precedent than the 
Court would dare to overthrow.19  The way forward to accepting the 
position of the Lopez and Morrison dissenters is likewise dismissed 
because it “would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the 
Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the 
States.”20  By all appearances, the Court has no good place left to stand. 
The way out of the Court’s prison of its own devise lies in the 
 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 109–26 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833). 
 15. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608–09; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59.  16. Justice Breyer, for example, goes to “Brandeis brief” lengths to make such a showing in Lopez, 514 U.S. at 615–44 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 17. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560–61.  18. Embarrassingly, the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 itself contains just such a provision, the constitutionality of which the Court does not question.  See 
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 n.5; see also 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000).  19. Only Justice Thomas is willing to dismantle the test by replacing the “substantial effects” prong.  See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 20. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. 
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traditional doctrine of incidental powers, especially in that doctrine’s 
textual declaration in the Necessary and Proper Clause.21  We must 
recognize that the three parts of the Court’s commerce test are not 
created equal.  Only the first two actually deal directly with interstate 
commerce, the third only deals with activity that substantially affects 
interstate commerce; but that is not itself interstate commerce.  How, 
then, does this “substantially affects” prong also fall within Congress’s 
commerce power at all (a question that has not occurred to Court or 
commentators, in the main)?  This can only happen by way of the doctrine 
of incidental powers, which finds its textual exposition in the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, and which endows Congress with the choice of 
appropriate means by which to pursue constitutionally enumerated ends. 
But unlike Congress’s power over the channels and instrumentalities 
of interstate commerce, this incidental power is not plenary.  Instead, by its 
very text and nature, it has a means-ends limitation, lest it convert the 
limited commerce power into a general police power.  It is, in a word, telic.22  
To sum this assertion up in a sentence, the commerce power extends to 
activity that is commercial in at least its nature or purpose.23  And the activities 
regulated in both Lopez and Morrison are neither.  They are, therefore, 
beyond Congress’s commerce power.  Is there any basis in precedent for 
my assertion?  You need look no further than the headnote of this Article 
from Marshall’s opinion for a unanimous Court in McCulloch.24 
This is not, no one will be surprised to read, the only way to parse the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, but it is the best.  Neither am I the only 
one to have taken it in this way.  Absolutely no originality is claimed for 
this idea.  On the contrary, I am standing on far more august shoulders 
 
 21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.  22. This useful term was introduced to commerce power discussion by David Engdahl.  See DAVID E. ENGDAHL, CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM IN A NUTSHELL § 3.01, at 20 (2d ed. 1987).  23. Chief Justice Rehnquist begins his opinion for the Court in Lopez by saying something close to this, but then strays from it later in the opinion.  He says, “The Act neither regulates a commercial activity nor contains a requirement that the possession be connected in any way to interstate commerce.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.  24. Especially note the words, “which are plainly adapted to that end.”  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). 
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here, notably those of Hamilton,25 Madison,26 Marshall,27 Story,28 and 
Justice Stone.29 
If the doctrine I present has this distinguished a lineage, why is it 
remarkable by its absence in the current commerce power discussion?  
Primarily because it does not serve the purposes of the hot, result-driven 
rhetoric of that debate in which the tail of the desired holding so often 
wags the dog of doctrine.  But a result-driven approach cannot succeed 
because it preaches only to the choir and lacks the resources to appeal to 
the nonbeliever and establish the basis for a broader consensus.  Most 
judges and commentators on both sides of the current argument see the 
commerce power issue through the prism of federalism,30 which is the 
area of greatest difference between the contending parties.  Unfortunately, 
they see it more as a club with which to beat the other side than as a clue 
in the puzzle of constitutional interpretation. 
This is not to deny that federalism is an area of significant importance.  
It is only to say that, as it is with happiness, agreement here is best 
reached indirectly, as the supervening by-product of other factors 
including, most importantly, those shared by both sides (for they will 
form the basis for whatever persuasion and agreement that will occur). 
II.  THE COURT’S CURRENT QUANDARY 
A.  The Lopez-Morrison Trilemma 
The Court’s commerce power mess, and the way out of it, can be 
neither understood nor explained apart from a description of how and 
why the Court has gotten itself in this position.  As with other 
uncomfortable positions, this has been the result of trying to do several 
different, seemingly inconsistent things at the same time.  These goals 
may all be laudable, but they jockey uncomfortably for position in the 
Lopez and Morrison opinions.  Those opinions give evidence of some 
 
 25. See, e.g., ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to 
Establish a Bank, in 8 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 63, 101–07 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1965) (setting out first the doctrine of incidental congressional powers later adopted and defended by Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Story). 
 26. See, e.g., JAMES MADISON, Speeches in the First Congress—Third Session, 
1791.  February 2—Bank of the United States, in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 19, 27–34 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906) (defending the notion of implied powers).  27. Especially in McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421. 
 28. See, e,g., STORY, supra note 14, at 109–15.  29. Writing for a unanimous Court in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).  30. In this they only follow the lead of the Court itself, which seeks to preserve an area of state police power beyond the reach of Congress’s commerce power.  See, for example, Justice Thomas’s Lopez concurrence.  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584–85 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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four main aims the Court seeks to achieve in the commerce power area: 
(1) to remain true to received, established commerce power  
 doctrine,31 
(2) to maintain a constitutional commitment to the related  
 principles of enumerated powers and limited government,32 
(3) to achieve and maintain a balance between state and federal 
 power,33 and 
(4) to avoid repudiating its post-New Deal (namely, 1937–1995)  
 commerce decisions.34 
Any plan this complicated and conflicted surely must have a high 
degree of difficulty.  And good intentions alone will not suffice when at 
least two simpler and easier alternative paths lie open to the Court.  One 
is to drop the first and fourth of the above aims, embrace the second and 
third aims, and roll back the revolution of 193735 in order to return to the 
more restrictive view of the commerce power that prevailed in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Of the Justices in the Lopez 
and Morrison majorities, only Justice Thomas displays any inclination to 
thus turn back the clock36 (despite protestations from the dissenters that 
this is precisely what the Court is, in fact, doing).37  The rest lack both 
the stomachs and the minds for such a move. 
 
 31. The Lopez and Morrison Courts find the kernel of that doctrine in the notion that congressional power reaches the channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce and activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.  See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.  32. Early in the Lopez opinion, the Court says, “We start with first principles.  The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552.  33. A “healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.”  Id.  (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)).  34. Even Justice Thomas would stop short of “totally rejecting our more recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence.”  Id. at 585 (Thomas, J., concurring).  35. Justice Souter accuses the Morrison majority of doing something approaching that, saying, “Cases standing for the sufficiency of substantial effects are not overruled; cases overruled since 1937 are not quite revived.”  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 654 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 36. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]he very notion of a ‘substantial effects’ test under the Commerce Clause is inconsistent with the original understanding of Congress’ powers and with this Court’s early Commerce Clause cases.”); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585 (Thomas, J., concurring).  37. Justice Souter analogizes the Court’s efforts in Lopez to the long-rejected doctrines of economic substantive due process.  See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 605–09. 
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The second, opposite path is to instead drop the second and the third 
of the above aims, and many traditional notions of constitutional law 
along with them,38 and follow the dissenters toward a broader, more 
politically demarcated commerce power, one that verges upon, if it does 
not achieve, a general federal police power.39  In doing this, the Court 
might avoid the futility it experienced in its attempt to impose 
federalism-based limits on the creeping federal regulation pursuant to 
the commerce power of the activities of the states themselves.40 
The Court has declined to follow either of these two easier paths for 
commendable reasons.  The aims it seeks to pursue are all proper aims, 
although the justifications it gives for what it does are unconvincing 
even to those who agree with the results41 (let alone to those who do 
not).42  My first task in this Article will be to explain what the Court has 
done in Lopez and Morrison; the second will be to offer suggestions as 
to how the result can be maintained while the justification is improved.  
For if that cannot be done, the Court will have placed itself in an 
uncomfortable trilemma where it will not go back (to pre-1937 doctrine), 
cannot go forward (and join the dissenters), and cannot satisfactorily 
justify the stand it has taken. 
B.  Not Back to the Future 
When Lopez was decided in 1995, the reaction in both lay and legal 
circles was strong and largely negative.  One prominent journalist, Linda 
Greenhouse, wrote, “[I]t is only a slight exaggeration to say that . . . the 
 
 38. In his Lopez concurrence, Justice Kennedy lists “separation of powers, checks and balances, judicial review, and federalism.”  Id. at 575 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  39. This is a repeated concern of the Lopez and Morrison Courts.  See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608 n.3 (assailing Justice Souter’s dissent for the “remarkable theory that the commerce power is without judicially enforceable boundaries”); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 (accepting that the government’s arguments would “convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States”).  40. In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976), the Court voided an extension of the Fair Labor Standards Act, which had been broadened in coverage several times since its enactment in 1938, to cover most state and local employees.  Although the Court had earlier, in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 125–26 (1941), upheld the original 1938 Act as a valid exercise of Congress’s commerce power, the Usery Court felt that this extension impermissibly intruded upon traditional state functions and violated federalism norms recognized in the Tenth Amendment. Usery, 426 U.S. at 841–52.  Nine years later, Usery was itself reversed in Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 556–57 (1985), as the Court rejected the concerns of Usery or, at least, returned them to the political arena for resolution.  41. In an article written in reaction to Lopez, Donald Regan writes, “I am inclined to think the result in Lopez is correct, though it is not my main object to establish that.  Even if the result is right, the opinion of the Court is unsatisfactory.”  Regan, supra note 4, at 555. 
 42. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 646–47 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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Court [is] a single vote shy of reinstalling the Articles of Confederation . . . .”43  
And legal academic Mark Tushnet asked if we were entering a 
constitutional moment (namely, a time of constitutional transformation, 
de jure or de facto, such as Reconstruction or the New Deal).44  Many saw 
the case as a portent of major constitutional change, for good or for ill. 
Given the sharp public reaction, the close 5–4 division on the Court, 
and the heated rhetoric of the Lopez and Morrison opinions themselves, 
it is surprising to discover upon actually reading the decisions on just 
how much the majority and the dissenters do, in fact, agree.  They all 
adhere, most importantly, to the same basic three-part test of commerce 
power constitutionality,45 and they accept the post-New Deal commerce 
power cases from which it derives.  This flows, in turn, from their 
common recognition of our modern integrated national economy and the 
functional approach to commerce regulation that goes along with it.  
What they differ in is the larger context against which they see this test 
and, therefore, the limitations and qualifications they place upon it.  But 
this disagreement should not be exaggerated into a desire by the majority 
to turn the clock back to the doctrines of those formalistic pre-1937 
commerce decisions.46 
The Lopez and Morrison dissenters themselves do not, in fact, go this 
far in their critique of the majority.  This is not to say that they raise no 
objections.  Two important criticisms that the dissenters do make of the 
Court’s opinions in these cases are that they are overly formalistic in 
their reasoning and that they are inconsistent with the Court’s 1937–1995 
run of commerce opinions, none of which struck down congressional 
legislation as beyond the scope of the commerce power. 
Drawing upon Swift & Co. v. United States,47 Justice Breyer describes 
how the cases look, “[a]s long as one views the commerce connection, 
not as a ‘technical legal conception,’ but as ‘a practical one.’”48  And 
later, he says the majority’s approach in these cases “fails to heed this 
 
 43. Linda Greenhouse, Focus on Federal Power, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1995, at A1 (discussing U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995)). 
 44. See Mark Tushnet, Living in a Constitutional Moment?: Lopez and Constitutional 
Theory, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 845, 845–46 (1995). 
 45. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608–09; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995); supra text accompanying note 15.  46. Linda Greenhouse notwithstanding.  See supra note 43 and accompanying text.  47. 196 U.S. 375, 398 (1905) (upholding a federal antitrust statute against a Commerce Clause challenge). 
 48. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 618–19 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Swift, 196 U.S. at 398). 
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Court’s earlier warning not to turn ‘questions of the power of Congress’ 
upon ‘formula[s]’ that would give ‘controlling force to nomenclature . . . 
and foreclose consideration of the actual effects of the activity in 
question upon interstate commerce.’”49  In a similar vein, Justice Souter 
in Morrison speaks, almost wistfully, of the “understanding [of the 
commerce power], free of categorical qualifications, that prevailed in the 
period after 1937 through Lopez.”50 
Both Justices also often assert or imply that the Court’s holdings and 
opinions in Lopez and Morrison are not consistent with the 1937–1995 
commerce power cases.  In Lopez, for example, Justice Breyer 
complains that “the majority’s holding runs contrary to modern Supreme 
Court cases that have upheld congressional actions despite connections 
to interstate or foreign commerce that are less significant than the effect 
of school violence.”51  And, in Morrison, Justice Souter asserts that 
“[t]he Act would have passed muster at any time between Wickard in 
1942 and Lopez in 1995, a period in which the law enjoyed a stable 
understanding.”52 
It will take the rest of this Article to fully answer these objections, but 
we can at least begin here.  Of the two charges just discussed, the charge 
of formalism against the Lopez and Morrison Courts is the more readily 
dispelled.  Let us start by looking at what the Court actually says in its 
opinions.  In his survey of the history of Commerce Clause precedent in 
Lopez, Chief Justice Rehnquist marks the beginning of federal 
commerce power doctrine (as opposed to limits on state law due to the 
Commerce Clause) with the cases involving the early federal legislation 
based upon the commerce power, namely the Interstate Commerce Act53 
in 1887 and the Sherman Antitrust Act54 in 1890.55  He notes that some, 
but not all, of those ensuing cases placed formalistic limits on the federal 
power56 and that the 1937–1995 cases largely eliminated those distinctions.57  
Now, if he were drawn to the formalisms of the 1887–1937 cases, the 
Chief Justice surely would have praised those cases and linked true 
commerce power doctrine to them.  But he does quite the opposite.  He 
 
 49. Id. at 627–28 (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942)) (first alteration in original). 
 50. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 641 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 51. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 625 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 52. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 637 (Souter, J., dissenting)  53. Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2000)).  54. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.). 
 55. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 554. 
 56. Id. at 554–55. 
 57. Id. at 555–57. 
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speaks approvingly of the New Deal cases that recognize broader federal 
commerce power, saying that “the doctrinal change also reflected a view 
that earlier Commerce Clause cases artificially had constrained the 
authority of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.”58 
Recognition of modern economic realities and their constitutional 
consequences can also be found in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in 
Lopez.  He, too, surveys the history of commerce power precedent.  
Looking at the 1887–1937 period, he contrasts those cases that “draw 
content-based or subject-matter distinctions, thus defining by semantic 
or formalistic categories those activities that were commerce and those 
that were not”59 with other decisions from the same era that utilized “a 
more sustainable and practical approach.”60 
Reviewing this history, Justice Kennedy draws “two lessons of 
relevance.”61  The first is “the imprecision of content-based boundaries 
used without more to define the limits of the Commerce Clause.”62  And 
the other is that “the Court as an institution and the legal system as a 
whole have an immense stake in the stability of our Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence as it has evolved to this point.”63  These are hardly the 
words of formalists and reactionaries eager to upend modern commerce 
power doctrine and turn the clock back to the pre-New Deal era or even 
more to the Articles of Confederation. 
C.  A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers 
But if the Court in Lopez and Morrison is uninterested in reverting to 
the era of formalistic commerce power jurisprudence, so, too, is it 
unwilling to move forward to a brave new world of a general federal 
police power pursuant to the Commerce Clause.  The reason why is 
simple and quite basic.  Such a move would be contrary to the Framers’ 
fundamental constitutional design.  This is made quite clear at the outset 
in Lopez, where, after tracing the procedural history of the case, the 
Court says, “We start with first principles.  The Constitution creates a 
Federal Government of enumerated powers.”64  In this, it does little more 
 
 58. Id. at 556. 
 59. Id. at 569 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 60. Id. at 571. 
 61. Id. at 574. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 552 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8). 
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than echo Marshall’s basic assumption in McCulloch that “[t]his 
government is acknowledged by all, to be one of enumerated powers,”  
to which he adds, “[T]he government of the Union, though limited in its 
powers, is supreme within its sphere of action.”65 
The reason this point is crucial here is that the Lopez and Morrison 
dissents provide no real, legal limitation on the commerce power.  And, 
as Madison asserted in a 1791 speech in the First Congress debating the 
nation’s first major commerce power issue, the establishment of a national 
bank, “An interpretation that destroys the very characteristic of the 
Government cannot be just.”66 
In Lopez, the Court says, “The Government’s essential contention, in 
fine, is that we may determine here that § 922(q) is valid because 
possession of a firearm in a local school zone does indeed substantially 
affect interstate commerce.”67  It then goes on to worry, “Thus, if we 
were to accept the Government’s arguments, we are hard pressed to posit 
any activity . . . that Congress is without power to regulate.”68  The 
Court’s misgivings arise, then, not from doubts that the activity in 
question falls within the general parameters of the three-part commerce 
power test distilled from earlier cases, but rather whether that test ought 
to be carried to its logical extremes in its application. 
The Court looks at what precedent, including McCulloch, teaches 
about enumerated powers69 and answers that question in the negative, 
concluding that “[t]o uphold the Government’s contentions here, we 
would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid 
fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a 
general police power of the sort retained by the States. . . .  This we are 
unwilling to do.”70 
In replying to this line of argument, Justice Breyer denies that the 
government’s (and the dissent’s) view of the commerce power would erase 
the distinction between the local and the national, that it would allow 
federal regulation of marriage, divorce, or child custody, or that it would 
expand the commerce power.71  But, as the majority notes, he “is unable to 
identify any activity that the States may regulate but Congress may not.”72 
By the time the Court next wrestles with this problem five years later 
in Morrison, the dissenters have a better reply to the majority’s 
 
 65. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819).  66. JAMES MADISON, supra note 26, at 27. 
 67. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563 (citation omitted). 
 68. Id. at 564. 
 69. Id. at 566–67. 
 70. Id. at 567–68. 
 71. See id. at 624 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 72. Id. at 564. 
VALAURI.DOC 9/18/2019  1:48 PM 
[VOL. 41:  405, 2004]  The Clothes Have No Emperor 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 417 
enumerated powers argument, one of confession and avoidance.  Justice 
Souter there says, “In short, to suppose that enumerated powers must 
have limits is sensible; to maintain that there exist judicially identifiable 
areas of state regulation immune to the plenary congressional commerce 
power even though falling within the limits defined by the substantial 
effects test is to deny our constitutional history.”73  He then goes on to 
object to the Court’s “reviving traditional state spheres of action as a 
consideration in commerce analysis.”74 
But if turnabout is fair play, he has no good objection to this move.  
For he himself is only recycling a move successfully used in Garcia to 
snuff out an earlier attempt by a Rehnquist-led Court to limit the use of 
the federal commerce power to regulate the states themselves.  That 
gambit does not deny the existence of limitations on the commerce 
power, but insists instead that these limits are political, rather than legal 
or constitutional, in nature (and, so, more matters for Congress than for 
the courts).75  And it is to these concerns raised by the Garcia gambit 
that we now turn. 
 D.  Garcia’s Ghost 
Sometimes the Court just muddles through, not having a clear doctrine 
in an area of constitutional law, but possessing the negative justification 
of avoiding the clear error that lies at both extremes.  All other things 
being equal, that may be sufficient cause for the Court seeking the mean, 
doctrinally speaking.  But all things are not equal here.  Even though the 
Court will not go back to pre-1937 formalism and cannot go forward to 
recognize a general federal police, it also has good reason to fear 
standing still. 
That good reason is Garcia’s ghost.  For this is not the Court’s first 
retreat from formalism or its first battle over federalism.  It is not even 
the first “death of federalism.”76  Some of the participants in the current 
struggle are veterans, as the dissenters hint, of the Court’s most recent 
battle in this area, which occurred between Usery77 in 1976, in which the 
Court attempts to set judicially enforceable federalism limits on congressional 
exercise of the commerce power on the states themselves, and Garcia 
 
 73. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 646 n.14 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 74. Id. at 647. 
 75. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547–55 (1985). 
 76. See infra Part V.A.  77. Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
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nine years later, in which the Court terminates these efforts and leaves 
Congress to police itself. 
These cases make much, positively and negatively, of the notion of 
traditional state functions as a line demarcating federalism-protected 
state exclusivity.  The Usery Court, for example, holds “[t]hat insofar as 
the challenged amendments operate to directly displace the States’ 
freedom to structure integral operations in areas of  traditional 
governmental functions, they are not within the authority granted 
Congress by Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.”78 
Garcia, in turn, mocks the very idea of judicially enforceable 
traditional state function guidelines and, after attacking their cogency 
from both historical and conceptual perspectives, concludes, “We 
therefore now reject, as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice, 
a rule of state immunity from federal regulation that turns on a judicial 
appraisal of whether a particular governmental function is ‘integral’ or 
‘traditional.’” 79 Then, after summarizing the defects of this approach 
(“inconsistent results . . . because it is divorced from those principles [of 
democratic self-governance]”), it continues, “If there are to be limits on 
the Federal Government’s power to interfere with state functions—as 
undoubtedly there are—we must look elsewhere to find them.”80  And  
after looking elsewhere, the Court concludes, “State sovereign interests, 
then, are more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in 
the structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations 
on federal power.”81 
The Garcia Court’s line of argument is echoed by the Morrison 
dissenters as an implied threat should they gain one more vote and 
become a majority.  For as we have already noted,82 Justice Souter does 
not reject the traditional notions of enumerated powers and limited 
government.  He insists only that they lack judicially enforceable formal, 
not to say formalistic, standards.  So failing this, he finds them subject only 
to political, procedural limitations.  The ball is thus put back in the court 
of the Lopez and Morrison majorities, and the burden is on them to come 
up with what they have not adequately done in those opinions—identify 
some clear, justified, judicially enforceable restraints on congressional 
exercise of the commerce power and thus exorcise Garcia’s ghost.  In 
the absence of such limits, Justice Souter and the other dissenters feel 
entitled to argue that, although political and procedural restraints on the 
commerce power may not be perfect, they are nevertheless the best 
 
 78. Id. at 852. 
 79. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546–47. 
 80. Id. at 547. 
 81. Id. at 552. 
 82. See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text. 
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option available for problem at hand (a “second best” solution). 
An argument of this type is also offered in the academic discussion of 
this issue by Lawrence Lessig, who suggests that American judicial 
review is regulated by what he calls “the Frankfurter constraint,” which 
asserts “[t]hat a rule is an inferior rule if, in its application, it appears to 
be political, in the sense of appearing to allow extra-legal factors to 
control its application.”83 
Applying this notion in the commerce power context, Lessig believes 
that “[t]he question is simply who should draw the limits: Congress or 
the Court. . . .  The Court would be best if it could construct tools that 
would limit Congress’s power without running afoul of the Frankfurter 
constraint.”84  Unfortunately, he concludes that, “[i]n [his] view, the tools 
that Chief Justice Rehnquist has provided in Lopez will run afoul of the 
Frankfurter constraint.”85 
So it is a common concern with judicial policy-making that moves 
Souter, Lessig, and Frankfurter to rein in judicial review of the 
Commerce Clause.  This concern may, as well, be seen as nothing more 
than an application in the context of the commerce power of standard 
justiciability political question limitations, which exclude from the 
federal courts a case in which there is “a lack of judicially discoverable 
and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of 
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for 
nonjudicial discretion.”86 
The objections raised by Souter, Lessig, and Frankfurter score strongly 
against the doctrine advanced by the Court in Lopez and Morrison (and, 
for that matter, in Usery), but they would fail against clear, discernable, 
enforceable, nonpolitical standards for the limitation of the commerce 
power.  I have been promising just such a doctrine, with an historical 
pedigree running back to Hamilton and Marshall, no less, since the 
beginning of this Article.87  The stage has been set to introduce the doctrine 
 
 83. Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 174.  As Lessig there notes, Justice Frankfurter discusses this notion in the context of the Commerce Clause.  See FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE: UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE 54 (1937) (discussing the need for restraints on “judicial policy-making” in constitutional interpretation by the Court in commerce cases).  84. Lessig, supra note 83, at 196. 
 85. Id.  86. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518 (1969) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)). 
 87. See supra text accompanying notes 12–13. 
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of incidental powers.  I will now do so, first in a functional context and 
then in an historical and doctrinal context.  Let the reader judge it according 
to the standards of Garcia’s ghost and the Frankfurter constraint. 
Judge it also according to traditional standards of constitutional 
evaluation, such as those in Philip Bobbitt’s typology of constitutional 
argument—history, text, structure, prudence, and doctrine.88  Bobbitt 
defines these traditional forms of constitutional argument in familiar ways.  
Historical argument, he says, “marshals the intent of the draftsmen of the 
Constitution and the people who adopted the Constitution.”89  In contrast, 
textual argument “is drawn from a consideration of the present sense of 
the words of the provision.”90  Next, he says, “Structural arguments are 
claims that a particular principle or practical result is implicit in the 
structures of government and the relationships that are created by the 
Constitution among citizens and governments.”91  Prudential argument 
looks not to the merits of a case, but “instead advanc[es] particular 
doctrines according to the practical wisdom of using the courts in a 
particular way.”92  And lastly, doctrinal argument “asserts principles 
derived from precedent or from judicial or academic commentary on 
precedent.”93  I choose these typologies precisely because they are not 
novel or controversial (the reader is free to choose her own, if she wishes). 
What purpose do these typologies serve?  They act as a sort of 
constitutional lingua franca that unites, at least in speech forms, those 
constitutional practitioners otherwise divided over case results.  They do 
this by roughly indicating the conventional standards to be met by any 
position claiming constitutional validity.  As a result, these typologies provide 
both the clubs that critics use to attack opposing positions as well as the 
shields that defenders employ to protect favored doctrines and results.  
Yes, problems can and do arise when different typologies point toward 
different case results,94 but fortunately, this difficulty does not arise with 
the doctrine of incidental powers propounded and defended here because 
it is the favored doctrine under all five typologies. 
 
 88. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 7 (1982) (setting out his five types of constitutional argument). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id.  94. Bobbitt has written a book addressing this problem, too.  See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991). 
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III.  THE CLOTHES 
A.  One Size Does Not Fit All 
Perhaps the simplest and most direct way of introducing the doctrine 
of incidental powers here is by asking the functional question of what 
case results a solution to the Lopez-Morrison trilemma would generate 
and then showing how incidental powers fits the bill.  As noted previously,95 
such a solution must satisfy four important aims—consistency with 
established commerce power doctrine, fidelity to the principles of 
enumerated powers and limited government, maintenance of federalism, 
and adherence to post-New Deal commerce power precedent.  In terms 
of commerce precedent, these aims require affirmation of the 
foundational Marshall Court decisions, such as McCulloch and Gibbons, 
as well as post-1937 cases including Lopez and Morrison, but they do 
not mandate defense of formalist decisions of the 1887–1937 period.  In 
fact, these aims impliedly reject those decisions as well as the views 
contained in the Lopez and Morrison dissents. 
Trying to generate these results using the three-part commerce power 
test nominally accepted by everyone on the Court, however, is 
precisely what got the Court into this trilemma in the first place.  For 
there is one persistent problem encountered by doctrinal tinkerers on 
(and off) the Court: tweaking the test in one place just causes 
difficulties in another place. 
Let me illustrate this unfortunate fact using what Justice Souter in 
Morrison calls “two conceptions of the commerce power, plenary and 
categorically limited, [which] are in fact old rivals.”96  Souter, along 
with the other Lopez-Morrison dissenters, defends the plenary approach 
to the three-part commerce power test,97 one that he identifies with post-
New Deal cases like United States v. Darby.98  He contrasts this 
conception with the purpose-based version of the test employed by the 
Court from which he dissents.  To leave no doubt in the mind of the 
reader as to which he favors, Justice Souter charges the Court’s approach 
 
 95. See supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text.  96. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 640 (2000).  97. In other words, one placing no formal limits on the scope of any of the three parts of the test. 
 98. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 640 (citing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding the constitutionality of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938)). 
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with guilt by association with Hammer v. Dagenhart,99 saying, “[T]he 
enquiry into commercial purpose, first intimated by the Lopez concurrence, 
is cousin to the intent-based analysis employed in Hammer, but rejected 
for Commerce Clause purposes in Heart of Atlanta and Darby.”100 
In a few short words, Justice Souter appears to have inflicted several 
grievous wounds on the doctrine of the Lopez-Morrison Courts.  For not 
only has he placed those cases in a league with one of the least appealing 
of the old formalistic commerce decisions, he has joined himself with 
important post-New Deal precedent both sides wish to vindicate.  And 
worse yet for the majority, he has done this on the basis of the old 
distinction between plenary and categorically limited conceptions of the 
commerce power. 
In picking Hammer as the one old, formalistic holding with which to 
brand the Lopez-Morrison Courts, Souter has chosen shrewdly.  For, 
among those cases, Hammer is the most notorious, the one with the best 
claim to the unsought title of “the Lochner101 of commerce power 
cases.”  Lochner, of course, has been called “one of the most condemned 
cases in United States history . . . used to symbolize judicial dereliction 
and abuse.”102  For this reason, it has been relegated to the lowest level 
of critical constitutional esteem, along with cases like Dred Scott v. 
Sandford103 and Plessy v. Ferguson.104 
Lest you think such a comparison hyperbolic, consider some striking 
similarities between Lochner and Hammer: 
(1)  Both cases void labor statutes enacted to protect exploited 
workers (adult bakers in Lochner and children in Hammer) 
from the superior power of employers. 
(2) Both are classic examples of formalism in the service of 
conservative judicial activism. 
 
 99. 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (holding a federal child labor act to be beyond Congress’s commerce power). 
 100. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 643 (citations omitted).  101. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (holding New York’s statutory limit on maximum hours worked by bakers unconstitutional on substantive due process grounds).  102. BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 23 (1980).  103. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 454 (1857) (denying citizenship rights to African-Americans on substantive due process grounds).  For the pairing of Lochner and Dred 
Scott, see PAUL KENS, JUDICIAL POWER AND REFORM POLITICS: THE ANATOMY OF 
LOCHNER V. NEW YORK 2 (1990).  104. 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (upholding state-ordered racial segregation in railway travel against an equal protection challenge).  The pairing of Lochner and Plessy occurs in the joint opinion by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter in Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 862–63 (1992). 
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(3) Both cases feature strong dissents from Justice Holmes in favor 
of the right of legislative majorities to enact their will, free of 
undue judicial scrutiny.105 
(4) Both holdings were overruled in the wake of the Court’s 
“revolution of 1937.”106 
Justice Souter’s example seems well chosen to drive home his argument 
and skewer the reasoning of the Lopez-Morrison Courts. 
But Justice Souter’s argument is not as ironclad as it first appears.  
Neither is his choice of illustrative cases as helpful to his side as he 
thinks.  There is, unseen by both sides here, a functional doctrinal 
alternative that avoids both his criticisms of the Lopez-Morrison 
approach and the reply objection that the plenary approach to the three-
part commerce power test “would bid fair to convert congressional 
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the 
sort retained by the States.”107 
The functional shortcomings of the approaches of both sides in the 
commerce power debate arise from a trait they share—they both take a 
categorical approach to the three-part test, albeit in different ways (for 
the plenary conception of the test is a categorical view, too).  Neither 
notices that the doctrinal difficulties encountered in applying the test do 
not arise with all the possible permutations of limits and parts.  No, they 
have occurred only with purpose-based or other limitations of the 
channels or instrumentalities prongs of the test (as in Hammer) and with 
a plenary approach to the substantial effects prong (as with the Lopez-
Morrison dissenters). 
In contrast, desired case results occur with a plenary view of the 
channels and instrumentalities parts of the test (as in Darby and Heart of 
Atlanta) and with a purpose limitation on the substantial effects prong of 
the test (as in Lopez and Morrison).  Functional considerations, then, 
suggest a version of the three-part commerce power test in which the 
channels and instrumentalities prongs are plenary in scope, but the 
substantial effects prong is purpose-limited. 
 
 105. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 277 (1918); Lochner, 198 U.S. at 74. 
 106. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116–17 (1941) (overruling Hammer); W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398–99 (1937) (overruling Lochner).  107. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995). 
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B.  Incidental Powers (A Telic Relation) 
A functional analysis of commerce power case results cannot be the 
last word, though.  For whatever functional advantages the noncategorical 
approach to the commerce power test offers might be outweighed when 
other factors are considered, sending my argument from the frying pan 
to the fire by trading the conflicts of the Lopez-Morrison trilemma for a 
theory that apparently violates the basic legal and constitutional 
demands of neutral principles and integrity that underlie Garcia’s ghost 
and the Frankfurter constraint.  An approach that applies different 
interpretive limits to different parts of the same constitutional test looks 
to be the very antithesis of generality, neutrality, and consistency. 
At least since Herbert Wechsler’s famous contribution to the 
constitutional controversy raised by the Court’s decision in Brown v. 
Board of Education,108 the Court’s critics have judged its decisions and 
doctrine according to the “special duty of the courts to judge by neutral 
principles.”109  Wechsler explains this duty, saying, “[T]he main constituent 
of the judicial process is precisely that it must be genuinely principled, 
resting with respect to every step that is involved in reaching judgment 
on analysis and reasons quite transcending the immediate result that is 
achieved.”110  To this, Robert Bork would add additional requirements.  
He states, “We have been talking about neutrality in the application of 
principles.  If judges are to avoid imposing their own values upon the 
rest of us, however, they must be neutral as well in the definition and the 
derivation of principles.”111 
More recently, Ronald Dworkin has argued against this type of ad hoc 
approach to legislations and constitutions, asserting that “we say that a 
state that adopts these internal compromises is acting in an unprincipled 
way.”112  He calls these provisions “checkerboard laws”113 and contends 
that they violate legal integrity in the way some discriminatory statutes 
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.114 
These strictures raise questions concerning the functionally crafted 
version of the three-part commerce power test that I have just 
introduced, for it is prima facie nonneutral and admittedly compromises 
 
 108. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding public school racial segregation violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).  109. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 16 (1959). 
 110. Id. at 15.  111. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 7 (1971).  112. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 183 (1986). 
 113. Id. at 179. 
 114. Id. at 184–85. 
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conflicting considerations (plenary power and purpose limitation) for 
purely practical reasons.  If I am to do more than offer the Emersonian 
defense that “[a] foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds,”115 
and in order to show that it is nevertheless an improvement on the 
doctrine offered by the Court in Lopez and Morrison, I need a substantial 
nonfunctional justification (such as might satisfy Bobbitt’s five 
typologies of constitutional argument,116 for example).  Fortunately, just 
such justification is provided by the constitutional doctrine of incidental 
powers, the Necessary and Proper Clause,117 and traditional precedent 
and doctrine interpreting them. 
The doctrine of incidental powers is the complement to the doctrine of 
enumerated powers embodied in the Federal Constitution.118  For if the 
federal government is strictly limited to those express powers (as it was, 
in theory, under the Articles of Confederation),119 as the nation found out 
under the Articles, the national government will be without effective 
power.  The doctrine of incidental powers remedies this defect by also 
giving the general government the related auxiliary powers needed to 
carry out its enumerated powers. 
At one time, the doctrine of incidental powers was hornbook law, and 
I will explain it from one of the great hornbooks of American 
constitutional law.120  But over the years it has been largely forgotten, 
and now it is unknown even to those who have great need for it.  One 
might not expect adherents of the plenary power view of the commerce 
power to bring up a doctrine that treats at least some federal power here 
as less than complete, but it is ignored as well by the Lopez-Morrison 
Courts, who could use it to better justify their holdings and doctrine and 
by some conservatives writing in the area.121 
In his constitutional commentaries, Justice Story introduces the 
 
 115. RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Self-Reliance, in 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON 25, 33 (1979). 
 116. See supra notes 88–94 and accompanying text.  117. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 118. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (“We start with first principles. The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers.”).  119. “Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.”  ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. II. 
 120. See STORY, supra note 14, at 109–26. 
 121. See, e.g., JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION’S POWER: THE SUPREME COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES 120–37 (2002) (attacking the Court’s Lopez-
Morrison decisions specifically and its federalism doctrine generally). 
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doctrine of incidental powers in order to illuminate the meaning of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.122  He says that the clause “is only declaratory 
of a truth, which would have resulted by necessary and unavoidable 
implication from the very act of establishing the national government, 
and investing it with certain powers.”123  He asks rhetorically of the 
enumerated powers, “What is a power, but the ability or faculty of doing 
a thing?  What is the ability to do a thing, but the power of employing 
the means necessary to its execution?”124  The clause is declaratory 
because the power is one inherent in the nature of government.125 
Just as the definition of commerce is often central to cases involving 
the channels and instrumentalities prongs of the three-part commerce 
power test, the definition and degree of necessity is often the central 
issue in incidental powers and Necessary and Proper Clause cases.  
Following Hamilton and Marshall again, Story rejects the view “that the 
constitution allows only the means, which are necessary; not those, 
which are merely convenient for effecting the enumerated powers.”126  
Instead, he believes, “‘necessary’ often means no more than needful, 
requisite, incidental, useful, or conducive to.”127  The upshot of this doctrine, 
according to Story, is that “congress shall have all the incidental and 
instrumental powers, necessary and proper to carry into execution all the 
express powers.”128 
The application of the doctrine of incidental powers to the three-part 
commerce power test thus provides a principled explanation for different 
treatment of the substantial effects prong from the channels and 
instrumentalities prongs.  The channels and instrumentalities parts of the 
three-part commerce power test concern interstate commerce itself and, 
so, fall within the plenary, enumerated Commerce Clause.  Substantial 
effects, in contrast, by definition are not interstate commerce themselves, 
but rather activities that only affect interstate commerce (they even need 
not be commercial in character).  They can fall within the commerce 
power by virtue of the doctrine of incidental powers if their regulation is 
 
 122. Congress’s power is “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.  123. STORY, supra note 14, at 109. 
 124. Id.  125. “In truth, the constitutional operation of the government would be precisely the same, if the clause were obliterated, as if it were repeated in every article.”  Id. at 110.  As we shall see below, in these arguments Story’s points paraphrase, where they do not actually quote, arguments made by Hamilton and Madison in The Federalist as well as Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch. 
 126. Id. at 114. 
 127. Id. at 118. 
 128. Id. at 113. 
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needful (i.e., convenient) to the enforcement of the Commerce Clause 
proper.  The different, purpose-limited scope of the substantial effects 
prong, then, is not merely permissible, but is, in fact, required by the 
telic nature of its enabling power. 
Application of the doctrine of incidental powers to the cases discussed 
above by Justice Souter serves not merely to illustrate the doctrine in a 
contemporary context; it also acts to undermine his attack on the Lopez-
Morrison cases.  In fact, it provides those case results with a sounder 
justification than they originally received from the Court.  Recall that 
Souter seeks to identify United States v. Darby with the plenary 
approach to the commerce power he propounds and also to link the 
purpose-limited reasoning in the disfavored Hammer decision with the 
Lopez-Morrison cases from which he dissents.129 
But as David Engdahl has noted, Darby is not a plenary commerce 
power case.  It is, instead, a twentieth century paradigm of the classic 
doctrine of incidental powers just described.130  Yes, Darby does 
overrule Hammer and vindicate federal power to regulate labor 
standards pursuant to the federal commerce power.  But the case is not a 
simple replacement of the purpose-limited view with the plenary version 
of that power.  As Engdahl points out, there are two quite different parts 
of the opinion because there are two different issues raised in the case.131  
Justice Stone, writing for an unanimous Court, sets out the issues in this 
way: 
first, whether Congress has constitutional power to prohibit the shipment in interstate commerce of lumber manufactured by employees whose wages are less than a prescribed minimum or whose weekly hours of labor at that wage are greater than a prescribed maximum, and, second, whether it has the power to prohibit the employment of workmen in the production of goods “for interstate commerce” at other than prescribed wages and hours.132 
On the first question, the Court invokes the plenary congressional power 
over interstate commerce,133 denying a purpose-limitation, saying, “The 
 
 129. See supra notes 96–106 and accompanying text. 
 130. See David E. Engdahl, The Necessary and Proper Clause as an Intrinsic 
Restraint on Federal Lawmaking Power, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 107, 110–11 (1998) (applying Marshall’s doctrine of implied powers to Darby). 
 131. See id. at 110 (noting that in addition to upholding the part of the Fair Labor Standards Act dealing with shipping prohibitions on plenary interstate commerce power grounds, “[t]he Court also upheld, on quite different grounds and in a separate part of the opinion, the wage and hour terms of the Act”).  132. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 108 (1941).  133. “The power of Congress over interstate commerce ‘is complete in itself, may 
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motive and purpose of a regulation of interstate commerce are matters 
for the legislative judgment upon the exercise of which the Constitution 
places no restriction and over which the courts are given no control.”134 
But this is only the first question, that involving regulation of 
interstate commerce itself (a subject matter within Congress’s 
enumerated powers).  When it comes to the second question, the one 
dealing with activity that is not in interstate commerce, but which only 
affects interstate commerce, the Court takes a different approach.  Here 
“the question [is] whether the employment . . . is so related to the 
commerce and so affects it as to be within the reach of the power of 
Congress to regulate it.”135  Citing our McCulloch headnote as authority, 
the Court states the following:  
The power of Congress over interstate commerce . . . extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.136 
Thus, pace Justice Souter, Darby stands not for the rejection of the 
purpose-limited approach to the federal commerce power and the victory 
of its plenary competitor.  No, instead it stands for the more nuanced 
approach of the traditional doctrine of incidental powers, which, applied 
to the three-part commerce power test here, gives a plenary reading of 
the channels and instrumentalities prongs of the test while purpose-
limiting only the substantial effects part.  Hammer is criticized and 
overruled, not because it uses a purpose limitation, but because it 
incorrectly employs it in the wrong context (Hammer is taken up 
pursuant to the first question in Darby).137 
The reversal of his Darby analysis also undercuts Justice Souter’s 
critique of, and worse yet from his perspective, offers a better rationale 
for, the Lopez-Morrison holdings,138 one that justifies a purpose-limited 
overruling of the substantial effects-based statutes in question in Lopez 
and Morrison, while leaving the earlier post-New Deal commerce power 
decisions untouched.  To examine the relation (namely, the degree of 
necessity) called for by the doctrine of incidental powers, we next turn to 
 
be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitution.’”  Id. at 114 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824)). 
 134. Id. at 115. 
 135. Id. at 117. 
 136. Id. at 118–19 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)). 
 137. See id. at 115–17.  138. For neither of these utilizes an incidental powers argument to reach its holding, although they should.  See Engdahl, supra note 130, at 115–17 (critiquing Lopez along these lines). 
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a discussion of some relevant history and precedent pertaining to the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.139 
IV.  THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 
A.  Hamilton and the Bank 
If the doctrine of incidental powers has a father, he is Alexander 
Hamilton, who gives an incidental powers defense of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause in The Federalist140 and also presents the doctrine full-
blown in his Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a 
Bank141 to President Washington.  In the constitutional ratification period 
in the late 1780s, the Necessary and Proper Clause, because of its 
seemingly vague terms and broad sweep, was a lightning rod for 
Antifederalist criticism.  Consider some representative attacks from the 
pseudonymous debate of the fall of 1787.  An Old Whig complains of 
the “undefined, unbounded and immense power which is comprised in 
the . . . clause.”142  Centinel worries that, combined with the Supremacy 
Clause, it would be used to “controul and abrogate any and every of the 
laws of the state governments, on the allegation that they interfere with 
the execution of any of their powers.”143  And Brutus is concerned that 
Congress might use the power deriving from this clause “as entirely to 
annihilate all the state governments, and reduce the country to one single 
government.”144 
It is in part to allay these fears and refute this parade of horribles that 
Hamilton and other Federalists take up pen.  Recognizing that the 
Necessary and Proper Clause and the Supremacy Clause “have been the 
sources of much virulent invective and petulant declamation against the 
 
 139. This will not be a general history or analytic discussion of the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Others have already done that.  See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Necessary and Proper, 44 UCLA L. REV. 745, 786–93 (1997) (examining the role of the Necessary and Proper Clause in limiting Congress to carrying out its enumerated powers); J. Randy Beck, The New Jurisprudence of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 581 (analyzing the Court’s recent federalism decisions from the perspective of the Necessary and Proper Clause).  140. THE FEDERALIST NO. 33 (Alexander Hamilton).  141. HAMILTON, supra note 25. 
 142. An Old Whig, No. 2, in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 239, 239 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). 
 143. Centinel, No. 5, in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 142, at 239, 239. 
 144. Brutus, No. 1, in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 142, at 240, 240. 
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proposed constitution,”145 Hamilton seeks to reassure ratifiers by 
refuting these dramatic charges.  He counters that these two clauses “are 
only declaratory of a truth, which would have resulted by necessary and 
unavoidable implication from the very act of constituting a Federal 
Government, and vesting it with certain specified powers.”146  He then 
asks rhetorically, “What is a power, but the ability or faculty of doing a 
thing?  What is the ability to do a thing but the power of employing the 
means necessary to its execution?”147  He would feign wonder that the 
Antifederalists are discomfited in the first place. 
Although he would modify his view later, Madison at the time joins 
Hamilton in defense of the Necessary and Proper Clause, asserting that 
“[w]ithout the substance of this power, the whole Constitution would be 
a dead letter.”148  He proceeds next to defend the form of the power by 
showing its superiority to other methods—the express power wording of 
the Articles of Confederation, positive enumeration of all powers, negative 
enumeration of prohibited powers, and silence on the subject.149  These 
assurances by Hamilton and Madison may have been sufficient for 
ratification purposes, but they do not clearly specify the sweep of the clause. 
This problem and its solution come into clearer focus during the 
debate over the establishment of a national bank in 1791.  In this debate, 
Madison joins Jefferson in what a few years earlier would have been 
called an Antifederalist view of the issue.  As was his wont, President 
Washington solicits the opinions of his cabinet on the matter and 
Hamilton responds with his Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to 
Establish a Bank.150 
Hamilton must here respond to Jefferson’s argument that “[t]he 
second general phrase is ‘to make all laws necessary and proper for 
carrying into execution the enumerated powers.’  But they can all be carried 
into execution without a bank.  A bank therefore is not necessary, and 
consequently not authorized by this phrase.”151  He must also find an 
answer to Jefferson’s assertion that “the constitution allows only the 
means which are ‘necessary’ not those which are merely ‘convenient’ 
for effecting the enumerated powers.”152  In the same month, Madison,  
then in Congress, argues against the bill, saying, “The essential 
 
 145. THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 204 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. (emphasis in original).  148. THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 303 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (emphasis in original). 
 149. Id. at 303–05.  150. HAMILTON, supra note 25, at 63–134.  151. Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for Establishing 
a National Bank, in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 142, at 245, 246. 
 152. Id. 
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characteristic of the Government, as composed of limited and enumerated 
powers, would be destroyed, if, instead of direct and incidental means, 
any means could be used, which . . . might be conducive to the successful 
conducting of finances.’”153 
In his Opinion, Hamilton sets the doctrine of incidental powers and 
the nature and scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause so clearly, 
authoritatively, and one might even say, canonically that later notable 
discussions (for example, by Marshall in McCulloch and Story in his 
Commentaries) are but restatements and glosses thereon.  He starts with 
basic premises by declaring: 
[T]his general principle is inherent in the very definition of Government . . . that every power vested in a Government is in its nature sovereign, and includes by force of the term, a right to employ all the means requisite, and fairly 
applicable to the attainment of the ends of such power.”154   
One upshot of this principle is that “there are implied, as well as express 
powers, and that the former are as effectually delegated as the latter.”155 
Hamilton counters Jefferson’s definition of “necessary” in the Necessary 
and Proper Clause by pointing out that “necessary often means no more 
than needful, requisite, incidental, useful, or conducive to.”156  To define 
the word narrowly, as Jefferson does, “would be to give it the same force 
as if the word absolutely or indispensibly had been prefixed to it.”157  
This does not mean that the power is without limit.  “For no government 
has a right to do merely what it pleases.”158  If that is so, what are the 
limits of this doctrine and clause and how are they determined?  
Hamilton answers, “It leaves therefore a criterion of what is 
constitutional, and of what is not so.  This criterion is the end to which 
the measure relates as a mean.”159 
B.  The McCulloch Model (Three, Not Two) 
There will be no general discussion of McCulloch here because, in 
truth, it does little new but enter the doctrine of Hamilton’s Opinion into 
constitutional case law.  Instead, I seek only to make two points, two 
 
 153. JAMES MADISON, supra note 26, at 30.  154. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 25, at 98. 
 155. Id. at 100. 
 156. Id. at 102. 
 157. Id. at 103. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 107. 
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crucial points, about the role of McCulloch in commerce power doctrine 
and history.  The first is that it is often left out of this doctrine and 
history altogether, with distorting effects resulting.  The second is that, 
when it is considered, it is usually misinterpreted in a crucial way. 
All too often, writers on the commerce power, on and off the bench, 
begin their histories five years too late, with Gibbons from 1824, rather 
than with McCulloch from 1819.  The problem with this, beyond mere 
obsessiveness, is that Gibbons is, in modern analytical terms, a channels 
and instrumentalities case.  Because it is a channels and instrumentalities 
case, it is concerned with the meaning of commerce in general and 
whether navigation is commerce, the Court concluding that “‘commerce,’ 
as the word is used in the constitution, comprehends navigation.”160  
With Gibbons as a starting point, there is a natural tendency to overlook 
and forget the doctrine of incidental powers and the traditional meaning 
of the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
This is what Chief Justice Rehnquist unfortunately does in his 
discussion of commerce power doctrine and history in Lopez.161  From 
this he is led to a categorical approach to the commerce power.  This 
leaves him with a Hobson’s choice—either adopt the plenary view of the 
dissenters and virtually cede Congress a general police power or else 
adopt a purpose-based limitation of the commerce power and risk the 
fate of Hammer, the Lochner of commerce power cases.  He is lucky that 
Lopez and, for that matter, Morrison are substantial effects cases, so that 
his mistake affects only the rationales, but not the results, of those cases. 
So, when the Chief Justice introduces the economic activity limitation162 
to the three-part commerce power test, he fails to restrict its application 
to the substantial effects prong only, perhaps because, having overlooked 
the notion of incidental powers, he lacks a clear rationale for doing so.  
This has at least two bad consequences.  One is that, as a result, he 
cannot say why Congress does have the power to regulate noneconomic 
 
 160. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 190 (1824).  161. He starts his discussion by saying, “The Court, through Chief Justice Marshall, first defined the nature of Congress’ commerce power in Gibbons v. Ogden.”  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 553 (1995) (citations omitted).  This is not quite true. What Marshall does in the quotation from Gibbons that follows this statement is to define commerce itself (after all, the issue in Gibbons), not the broader commerce power, which also includes Congress’s incidental power as auxiliary to its enumerated power under the Commerce Clause proper. The Chief Justice is by no means alone in this misstep.  Notable commentators also make the same move.  Donald Regan, for example says, “[O]ur Commerce Clause jurisprudence began with Gibbons v. Ogden, and Gibbons is commonly read as a prescient anticipation of the essentially unlimited commerce power we now recognize.”  Regan, supra note 4, at 573 (footnote omitted).  162. “Where economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560. 
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activity involving the channels and instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce.  He cannot say why because Congress, in fact, does, contrary 
to the implication of his limitation, indeed have the power to regulate 
noneconomic activity in the channels and instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce, as the Court in Morrison seems to concede. 
The Violence Against Women Act of 1994, under scrutiny in that 
case, itself contains such a provision.  The Court there remarks that 
“[s]ection 40221(a) of the Act creates a federal criminal remedy to 
punish ‘interstate crimes of abuse including crimes committed against 
spouses or intimate partners . . . who cross State lines to continue the 
abuse.’”163  It goes on to note with apparent approval that “[t]he Courts 
of Appeals have uniformly upheld this criminal sanction as an appropriate 
exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority, reasoning that ‘[t]he 
provision properly falls within the first of Lopez’s categories as it 
regulates the use of channels of interstate commerce.’”164 
But how can the place of occurrence affect or determine the economic 
or noneconomic nature of the underlying act itself, the factor made 
pivotal by the Court in Lopez?  Plainly, it cannot.  But how then can 
whether or not the abuse occurs in the channels and instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce determine the constitutional power of Congress to 
criminalize it?  Yet I agree with both views of the Court here: the 
constitutionality of section 40221(a) of the Act and the unconstitutionality 
of the civil remedy, 42 U.S.C. § 13981. 
The Chief Justice does not have a good rationale for these discordant 
intuitions because the Gibbons family of cases cannot provide him with 
one.165  But McCulloch and its progeny, in contrast, through the doctrine 
of incidental powers and the Necessary and Proper clause, can explain 
why these differing results are called for. 
The initial question before the Court in McCulloch is, “[H]as Congress 
power to incorporate a bank?”166  Because there clearly is no such 
 
 163. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 n.5 (2000) (quoting S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 43 (1993)). 
 164. Id. at 614 n.5 (quoting United States v. Lankford, 196 F.3d 563, 571–72 (5th Cir. 1999)) (alterations in original).  165. This is why no one wins the debate in Lopez between Justices Thomas and Breyer over the meaning and significance of Gibbons—that case is largely irrelevant to the central issues in Lopez.  See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 593 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 630 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  166. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819). 
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express congressional power,167 the question is, then, whether this power  
falls within its implied or incidental powers, for “a government, 
entrusted with such ample powers . . . must also be entrusted with ample 
means for their execution.”168  Reviving Jefferson’s earlier argument, 
Maryland argues that Congress is limited to means “such as are 
indispensable, and without which the power would be nugatory.”169  And 
echoing Hamilton’s reply to Jefferson, Marshall asserts that the word 
“necessary” “frequently imports no more than that one thing is convenient, 
or useful, or essential to another.”170  Ultimately, Marshall delivers the 
statement that is our headnote,171 summarizing the means-ends 
requirement of incidental powers. 
Now, that may be enough to resolve the issue before the Court, but it is 
not enough to clearly resolve the question of how close a means-ends 
relation is required.  And that brings me to my second McCulloch-related 
point.  Judges and commentators too often assume a false dichotomy 
relating to necessity and McCulloch—if the absolutely necessary 
definition proffered by Maryland is to be rejected, then almost anything 
goes,172 as might pass a rational basis test.  So, for example, in Lopez, after 
rehearsing relevant commerce power doctrine, Justice Breyer says, 
“Applying these principles to the case at hand, we must ask whether 
Congress could have had a rational basis for finding a significant (or 
substantial) connection between gun-related school violence and interstate 
commerce.”173  So too, in Morrison, after quoting Darby on the Necessary 
and Proper Clause,174 Justice Souter says, “Accordingly, for significant 
periods of our history, the Court has defined the commerce power as 
plenary, unsusceptible to categorical exclusions, and this was the view 
expressed throughout the latter part of the 20th century in the substantial 
effects test.”175 
 
 167. See id. at 406 (“Among the enumerated powers, we do not find that of establishing a bank or creating a corporation.”). 
 168. Id. at 408. 
 169. Id. at 413. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 421.  172. And so to mock this view of the Commerce Clause, Judge Kozinski referred to it as the “Hey, you-can-do-whatever-you-feel-like Clause.”  Alex Kozinski, Introduction 
to Volume Nineteen, 19 HARV J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 5 (1995).  173. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 618 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  174. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 640 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).   The power of Congress . . . extends to those activities intrastate which so affect  interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. 
Id.  (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941)). 
 175. Id. 
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When I presented an earlier version of this Article to law professors, one 
strong reaction of theirs was that Marshall shared this view too, that he never 
met an assertion or expansion of federal power he did not like.  But that 
position is not consistent with Marshall’s words in McCulloch.  Textually, the 
best indication of this is the pretext language in McCulloch itself: 
[S]hould Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government; it would become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring such a decision come before it, to say that such an act was not the law of the land.176 
Those who believe that Marshall in McCulloch takes a rational basis 
view of the Necessary and Proper Clause do not know quite what to 
make of this statement because it does not fit in with their theory of the 
case and the clause.177  What they should take from it is that the doctrine 
of incidental powers and the Necessary and Proper Clause must have 
some teeth. 
And if one textual bit is not enough for them, the controversy arising 
out of the McCulloch decision provides yet more evidence.  Not 
surprisingly, Marshall’s decision provoked criticism from states’ rights 
adherents who opposed a broad reading of federal power.  The most 
articulate and influential critics resided in his home state of Virginia.  
In the spring and summer of 1819, Amphictyon and Hampden (this 
was another pseudonymous debate) assailed Marshall and McCulloch 
in the Richmond Enquirer.178  The main points of their attack are 
straightforward and familiar.  On March 30, Amphictyon says, “Although 
every one admits that the government of the United States is one of 
limited powers . . . , yet so wide is the latitude given to the . . . word 
‘necessary’ . . . that it will . . . really become a government of almost 
unlimited powers.”179  He goes on to worry that the Antifederalist 
prophesy of unlimited federal power under a supposedly limited 
Constitution is coming true.180 
Marshall replies to Amphictyon in the Philadelphia Union under the 
pseudonym, “A Friend of the Union.”  In his April 24, 1819 piece, 
 
 176. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423.  177. One commentator tries to minimize the statement by saying that Marshall only “teasingly” suggests it.  See Evan H. Caminker, “Appropriate” Means-Ends Constraints 
on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1136 (2001).  178. JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 52, 106 (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969). 
 179. Id. at 64, 65. 
 180. Id. at 74. 
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Marshall opines that there are three possible senses that might be given 
to the phrase “necessary and proper”—a restricted sense (namely, the 
one favored by Amphictyon and Marshall’s other critics at the time), a 
liberal sense (the anything goes view they accused him of), and the fair 
sense (the intermediate view he, in fact, took in McCulloch).181  Marshall 
spends all his effort arguing for the fair sense, the view of incidental 
powers running back to Hamilton. 
C.  The Fourteenth Amendment Analogy 
The doctrine of incidental powers I have been presenting is a general 
doctrine of federal power, not one peculiar to the commerce area 
(although for historical and practical reasons, that may be its most fertile 
area of application).  One would expect, then, to see it and the issues we 
have seen here recur with respect to other constitutional provisions and 
federal powers.  And so it does.  The debates and disagreements we have 
traversed here are largely replayed in the history of the other major fount 
of federal legislative power—Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
This is no coincidence, but is due to the same causes that produced 
disagreement here—differences over theories of constitutional 
interpretation, the scope of federal power, and case results. 
I will not here present The McCulloch Theory of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  That has already been done182—and I disagree with it.  A 
brief survey of some ways in which Section Five framing history, early 
interpretation, and current doctrine support my account of incidental 
powers and, in turn, are supported by it will suffice. 
From the beginning, Section Five tracks Necessary and Proper Clause 
language and doctrine.  The original proposed draft from Representative 
John Bingham of Ohio provides that “[t]he Congress shall have power to 
make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to secure to the 
citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the 
several states.”183  The adopted text uses the word “appropriate” as the 
bearer of the “necessary and proper” notion.  The first Supreme Court 
case interpreting Section Five says, “Whatever legislation is 
appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the amendments 
have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions 
 
 181. Id. at 91, 91–105. 
 182. See, e.g., Steven A. Engel, Note, The McCulloch Theory of the Fourteenth 
Amendment: City of Boerne v. Flores and the Original Understanding of Section 5, 109 YALE L.J. 115, 134–40 (1999) (arguing that Marshall held a loose, rational relationship view of the Necessary and Proper Clause and of Congress’s incidental powers in 
McCulloch).  183. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866). 
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they contain, . . . if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of 
congressional power.”184  And recent cases, too, pay their respects, 
saying for example, “[T]he McCulloch v. Maryland standard is the 
measure of what constitutes ‘appropriate legislation’ under § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”185 
That is the good news.  The bad news is that there are two different 
understandings of the meaning of “appropriate” here, both claiming 
roots in McCulloch and the Necessary and Proper Clause—one 
corresponding to Marshall’s liberal sense of “necessary and proper” and 
the second corresponding to his fair sense.186  It should come as no 
surprise that adherents of the liberal sense react with anger and surprise 
when the Court, in reviewing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 
applies scrutiny with some teeth to hold it unconstitutional.187  The Court 
requires that “[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality between 
the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that 
end.”188  It is unfortunate that the Court does not employ this sort of 
incidental powers language in Lopez and Morrison as well. 
One common major criticism of the Court’s decision in Boerne is that 
it improperly narrows the McCulloch standard.  Evan Caminker, for 
example, says, “Rather than being assessed under the conventional 
‘rational relationship’ test established by McCulloch v. Maryland in the 
context of Article I powers, now Section 5 regulations . . . must survive 
the stricter standard of ‘congruence and proportionality’ between means 
and legitimate ends.”189  But the import of all I have argued before is 
that, if McCulloch is to be the standard (and I have noted significant 
historical support for that assumption), then means-ends congruence and 
proportion is precisely what is demanded. 
V.  A FEDERAL SYSTEM 
A.  The Third Death of Federalism? 
Most other accounts of Lopez and Morrison have seen the cases 
through the prism of federalism.  I have not, preferring instead the 
 
 184. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345–46 (1879).  185. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966). 
 186. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.  187. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). 
 188. Id. at 520.  189. Caminker, supra note 177, at 1131–32 (footnotes omitted). 
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perspective of limited and enumerated powers.  But the two topics are 
not unrelated, and I do have two federalism-related arguments to make 
in support of my general position.  The first is an argument against 
Garcia’s ghost, and the second is an observation about the notion of 
constitutional interpretation in a federal system. 
When the “revolution of 1937” greatly expanded commerce power 
interpretation, Edward Corwin marked The Passing of Dual Federalism.190  
And when the Court overruled National League of Cities in the Garcia 
case in 1985, William Van Alstyne noted The Second Death of 
Federalism.191  Is it crying wolf now to worry that in the 5–4 splits in 
Lopez and Morrison, we are but one vote switch from a third death of 
federalism?  The very number should give me pause, but the threat of 
what Justice Souter’s Garcia-based critique of the Lopez-Morrison 
position poses spurs me to voice my concern. 
The argument by Justice Souter that I have called Garcia’s ghost192 is 
presented as a fallback solution to compensate for the perceived faults of 
the Court’s commerce power doctrine.  My aim in the main heretofore 
has been to work to strengthen the justification for that doctrine, but in 
this section my aim is negative—to undercut the plausibility of and 
support for Garcia’s ghost itself.  For that plausibility is illusory.  
Garcia’s ghost says that if, as it argues, substantive protections for 
federalism are unworkable, then procedural protections can serve 
instead.  These protections lie in “the structure of the federal system,”193 
namely, in protection by Congress. 
But protection of state interests by Congress is no protection at all.  
The fox running the henhouse nature of this argument can be made 
clearer by analogy.  The implication of Souter’s argument is that the 
states will find protection in Congress because they are represented in 
Congress.  If we substitute “individual rights” for “state interests” in this 
argument, would anyone accept that the assertions that individual rights 
cannot be clearly specified or that, even if they can, the rights of 
individuals will be adequately protected by Congress simply because 
individuals are represented in Congress?  Certainly not.194 
Another argument against Garcia’s ghost is that it only purports to limit 
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VALAURI.DOC 9/18/2019  1:48 PM 
[VOL. 41:  405, 2004]  The Clothes Have No Emperor 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 439 
federal power, but it in fact leaves federal power over the states unlimited.  
Let us look at definitions.  Around the time that the Framers in Philadelphia 
were trying to craft a constitution of limited government, the noted 
English legal philosopher Jeremy Bentham was giving advice to the French 
concerning their constitution.  Among other things, he wanted to convince 
them of the necessity of an omnipotent legislature, saying the following: 
If there were a proposition in government more self-evident than any other, one should think it would be that at every period there should be some one authority competent to do every thing that may require to be done by government, and that that authority should extend to every case whatsoever.195 
Does Bentham’s “self-evident” proposition not describe Congress 
under Garcia’s ghost?  What are the legal limits on its power?  It is the 
very definition of sovereignty in that it is “incapable of legal limitation.”196  
Under this scheme Congress may do whatever it chooses to do to the 
states without violating states’ rights or giving the states any formal 
recourse.  If this is protection, then protect me from such protection. 
B.  Federalism and Constitutional Interpretation 
The other federalism argument I advance is one that, as far as I can 
tell, is original.  It is simply this: If all parties agree that our Constitution 
establishes a federal system, does that fact have any structural implications 
for constitutional interpretation generally and for the commerce power 
debate in particular?  I think that it has at least one—that the nature of 
the federal system argues for Marshall’s “fair sense” of necessary and 
proper over the two other alternatives. 
How?  Ask what level of incidental power is appropriate in each sort 
of system—confederation, federal government, and unitary government.  
The Articles of Confederation properly limit federal power strictly to 
expressly granted powers, the better to preserve the sovereignty of the 
individual states.  Unitary governments need no distinction between 
express and incidental powers because the unitary government has 
general legislative power.  So, England with parliamentary supremacy 
has traditionally lacked a written constitution.  But the intermediate 
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category, federal government, needs some balance, some rough division 
of powers to maintain checks and balances between the state and federal 
governments.  That balance is provided, in part, by the doctrine of 
incidental powers, as declared by the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
VI.  CONCLUSION: JUST AN OLD FEDERALIST 
After reading this Article, given its arguments and especially given its 
heroes (Hamilton, Marshall, and Story), some wag might remark that I 
am just an old Federalist.  That wag would be right.  But an old 
Federalist is not a bad thing to be in this contest.  If the Frankfurter 
constraint disfavors influence by political, nonlegal factors,197 it is a 
definite advantage to be an adherent of a doctrine associated with a long-
defunct political party.  But there are stronger reasons, too.  The 
Federalist position satisfies so many of Bobbitt’s typologies of 
constitutional argument198 for the obvious reason that Federalists wrote 
the Constitution and imbued it with their principles and worldview. 
And speaking of worldviews, let me close with an irony.  The 
Federalist view I expound insists that the Necessary and Proper Clause is 
merely declaratory of principles already in the Constitution and, as Story 
asserts, “the constitutional operation of the government would be 
precisely the same, if the clause were obliterated, as if it were repeated 
in every article.”199  Why do the old Federalists argue that the doctrine is 
obvious even without explicit statement, when today we cannot even 
agree on the meaning of the written clause?  Why do the Lopez-Morrison 
dissenters seek to implement the Antifederalists’ parade of horribles, 
which the Framers explicitly rejected? 
Robert Cover answers these questions when he says the following: 
We inhabit a nomos—a normative universe. . . .  The rules and principles of justice, the formal institutions of the law . . . are, however, but a small part of the normative universe that ought to claim our attention. . . .  Once understood in the context of the narratives that give it meaning, law becomes not merely a system of rules to be observed, but a world in which we live.200 
We lack understanding because we no longer inhabit the Founders’ 
constitutional nomos and so, no longer fully comprehend it.  In a larger sense, 
then, this Article preaches a homecoming.  And in regaining and reemploying 
the doctrine of incidental powers, we are not “dissing Congress,”201 but 
rather becoming reacquainted with our constitutional nomos. 
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